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Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law 
Jonathan Granoff ∗  
Bullets kill men, but atomic bombs kill cities. A tank is a defense 
against a bullet, but there is no defense against a weapon that can de-
stroy civilization. . . . Our defense is law and order.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nuclear weapons age began at 5:29:45 a.m. Mountain War 
Time, July 16, 1945, when the first atom bomb was tested in a por-
tion of the bleak barren Alamogordo bombing range in the New 
Mexico desert chillingly named Jornado de Muerto (Journey of 
Death).2 After the thunderous roar of the shock wave, a huge pillar 
of smoke rose 30,000 feet, creating the first icon of the nuclear 
age—the fearsome mushroom cloud. A blast of energy of unprece-
dented3 destructive magnitude bathed the surrounding mountain 
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 1. THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 177 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2000). 
 2. See LOS ALAMOS 32 (Los Alamos Historical Society ed., 1999). 
 3. See id. at 53. Brigadier General T.F. Farrell described the moment as follows: 
The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous, 
and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever oc-
curred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was 
lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It 
was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of 
the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but 
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range in a brilliant light that could be seen 150 miles away. J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, the organiza-
tion responsible for the design of the first atomic bomb as part of the 
Manhattan Engineer District of the War Department, uttered a sober 
description from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita: “‘Now I 
am become Death, destroyer of worlds.’”4 
The new millennium begins with 32,000 nuclear bombs5 pos-
sessed by eight nations containing 5,000 megatons of destructive en-
ergy.6 This is a global arsenal more than sufficient to destroy the 
world.7 
 
must be seen to be imagined. Seconds after the explosion came, first, the air blast 
pressing hard against the people, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, 
sustained awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel we puny 
things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved for the 
Almighty. 
Id. 
 4.  DOUGLAS ROCHE, AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK 6 (1995) (quoting JOHN NEWHOUSE, 
WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 41 (1989)). 
 5. See REPAIRING THE REGIME, app. V (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000); CHARLES J. 
MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR 
WORLD 397–98 (2000) (Nuclear weapons include fission and fusion); see also THOMAS B. 
COCHRAIN ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR FORCES AND 
CAPABILITIES (1984). “Conventional weapons typically have a destructive capability measur-
able in the release of some number of tons of TNT.” MOXLEY, supra, at 397 n.2 (citing 
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 6 (1991)). A fission bomb, which we refer to as an “atomic” bomb, 
is the kind that was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and has the destructiveness of thou-
sands of tons of TNT (kilotons). “Little Boy,” dropped on Hiroshima, was approximately 12–
15 kilotons, and “Fat Man,” the plutonium fission bomb, dropped on Nagasaki, had about 22 
kilotons. Id. at 398 n.4 (citing COCHRAN ET AL., supra, at 32). “Fusion (‘hydrogen’ or ‘ther-
monuclear’) bombs, have the destructiveness of up to some millions of tons of TNT (mega-
tons, mt).” MOXLEY, supra, at 398 (citing COCHRAN ET AL., supra, at 26–27). 
 6. REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 5, at app. V. Russia and the United States have 
over 97% of this existing arsenal. Id. 
 7. See STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE 9 (1997). “The power of 
the 32,500 warheads would roughly equal 1 million Hiroshima-type bombs, one of which de-
stroyed almost all of the buildings within a 12-square-mile area and killed 140,000 of the city’s 
350,000 people during the first five months after detonation.” Id. 
The Royal Swedish Academy of Science in 1982 concluded that a thermonuclear 
war using approximately 5,000 megatons [of nuclear weapons] would destroy all 
major cities of 500,000 population or greater in the United States, Canada, Europe, 
the USSR, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Korea, Vietnam, Australia, South Africa, 
and Cuba. Theoretically, in 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union had the 
ability to destroy the world three times over with their strategic nuclear weapons and 
could still do so at least once today. Carl Sagan and others warned that a war involv-
ing as few as 100 megatons could trigger a nuclear winter. This would involve, say, 
hitting one hundred cities with 1-megaton warheads. This would induce such a drop 
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The United Nations Charter was drafted without the full recog-
nition of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.8 The very first reso-
lution9 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
called for the elimination of atomic bombs. The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter the NPT or the 
Treaty)10 supplements the Charter and is now, with 187 states par-
ties, the most adhered-to treaty in the world. Designed to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, it contains five commitments: “ac-
ceptance of a political and moral norm against the possession of nu-
clear weapons; an obligation to eliminate existing stocks; interna-
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses of energy; special assistance to 
developing countries; and measures to ensure a world free of nuclear 
weapons.”11 The Treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, for a 
twenty-five year period and was indefinitely renewed in 1995.12 In 
essence, it promises a world in which nuclear weapons are eliminated 
 
in global temperatures and reduction of light that the resulting starvation and 
weather extremes would conceivably reduce the population of the planet to prehis-
toric levels. By this measure, we had then the ability to destroy the world 148 times 
in 1985 and 50 times over today. 
REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 5, at 13 n.2. 
 8. JOHN BURROUGHS, THE (IL)LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS 29 (1997). The Charter was adopted six weeks before the bombing of Hiroshima. 
 9. Resolution I (1) was adopted unanimously on January 24, 1946 at the First Session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations. See Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, U.N. 
GAOR 52d Sess., Agenda Item 71, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/52/7 (1997). 
 10. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art. VI, 21 
U.S.T 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. See also ROCHE, supra note 4, app. at 99–105. 
 11. DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE ULTIMATE EVIL 29 (1997); see also Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10. 
 12. See Decision 3 of the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of 
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.1995/ 32 (1995) (available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/ 
1995dec3.htm>). For a summary of the commitments that were made to induce the indefinite 
extension of the Treaty at the Review and Extension Conference, see Decision 2 of the Final 
Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (1995) (available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/1995dec2.htm>). See also REPAIRING THE REGIME, 
supra note 5, at app. II. See ROCHE, supra note 4, at 21–45, for an excellent analysis of the 
negotiations in obtaining the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and article VI of the 
Treaty, which states, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control.” Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, su-
pra note 10, art. VI. 
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and technological cooperation is widespread.13 
The five declared nuclear weapon states14—United States, United 
Kingdom, Russia, China, and France—have solemnly obligated 
themselves under Article VI of the NPT to nuclear disarmament.15 
At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, April 24 through May 
20, 2000, at the United Nations in New York City, all parties to the 
Treaty, including the five nuclear weapon states, affirmed “[a]n un-
equivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish 
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear dis-
armament to which all States parties are committed under Article 
VI.”16 
This legal duty does not contain an enforceable timeline. Many 
of the 182 non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT have been 
induced to legally bind themselves, under the NPT, to refrain from 
developing nuclear weapons by the commitment of the nuclear 
 
 13. See ROCHE, supra note 11, at 29. 
 14.  
Nuclear-Weapon States: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States. 
Each of these five states originally declared its nuclear-weapons program and was 
recognized under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-
weapon state because it had tested a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967. Esti-
mated total nuclear warhead stockpiles: United States, 12,070; Russia, 22,500; 
United Kingdom, 260; France, 450; China, 400. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, nuclear weapons remained in the ter-
ritory of many of the new independent states. Strategic nuclear weapons remained in 
three besides Russia: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Russia was recognized as 
the Soviet Union’s sole nuclear-weapon-state successor. All tactical nuclear weapons 
were withdrawn to Russia by June 1992. Russia assumed control over all Soviet nu-
clear weapons, and all strategic nuclear weapons were withdrawn to Russia by No-
vember 1996 – completing an unprecedented denuclearization process . . . . 
Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapons States: India, Israel, Pakistan. 
Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear explosives tests in May 1998 and de-
clared themselves nuclear-weapon states. Neither is an NPT member, and neither is 
recognized by the NPT or other international treaties as a nuclear-weapon state. 
Neither is believed to have deployed nuclear weapons as of June 1998, but India is 
considered to be able to assemble sixty to seventy weapons, and Pakistan about fif-
teen weapons, on short notice. Israel, which also is not an NPT member, has not 
declared its nuclear weapon capability but is believed to have an operational arsenal 
of over one hundred weapons. 
REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 5, app. IV. 
 15. See ROCHE, supra note 4, at 21–45. 
 16. Douglas Roche, An Unequivocal Landmark (visited Nov. 16, 2000) 
<http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ABOUSH%20NUCS/RocheNPTReport-
May27.html>. For the full text of the treaty, see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, supra note 10, and ROCHE, supra note 4, app. at 99–105. 
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weapon states to negotiate nuclear disarmament.17 The Treaty’s 
nonproliferation requirements are recognized as serious and weighty; 
the nuclear disarmament commitments will not be accomplished 
without greater political pressure. 
There is inadequate public understanding of the political,18 scien-
tific,19 legal,20 ethical,21 moral,22 and military23 dimensions of nuclear 
 
 17. See Luiz F. Machado, The View from Brazil, in REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 
5, at 275. 
Non-proliferation and disarmament are different, although mutually reinforcing, 
concepts. Only total and complete nuclear disarmament can put an end to nuclear 
proliferation. This is the very logic behind the NPT’s basic bargain, by which the 
non-nuclear weapon states agreed to forgo those weapons and the nuclear weapon 
states agreed to negotiate disarmament measures aimed at the ultimate elimination 
of nuclear weapons. 
Id. 
 18. General George Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Strategic Air 
Command (1991–92) and U.S. Strategic Command (1992–94), who was responsible for all 
nuclear forces of the American Air Force and Navy, has reported being amazed  
by how little high-level scrutiny (the U.S. nuclear war plan) had received over the 
years, and by how readily his military colleagues threw up their hands and rolled 
their eyes at the grim challenge of converting mathematical estimates of the destruc-
tiveness of nuclear arms and the resilience of Soviet structures into dry statistical 
formulas for nuclear war. 
“It was all Alice-in-Wonderland stuff,” [General] Butler says. The targeting 
data and other details of the war plan, which are written in an almost unfa-
thomable million lines of computer software code, were typically reduced by 
military briefers to between 60 and 100 slides that could be presented in an 
hour or so to the handful of senior U.S. officials who were cleared to hear it: 
“Generally, no one at the briefing wanted to ask questions because they didn’t 
want to embarrass themselves. It was about as unsatisfactory as could be imag-
ined for that subject matter. The truth is that the President only had a superfi-
cial understanding” of what would happen in a nuclear war, Butler says. Con-
gress knew even less because no lawmaker has ever had access to the war plan, 
and most academics could only make ill-informed guesses. 
MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 473 n.27 (quoting R. Jeffrey Smith, Ex-Commander of Nukes Wants 
to Scrap Them, A Believer No More, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 29, 1998; see also R. Jeffrey 
Smith, The Dissenter, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 7, 1997, at W18.). 
 19. The scientific dimension of nuclear weapons is understandably difficult to compre-
hend. “The UN in its 1991 report found the ‘(n)uclear weapons represent a historically new 
form of weaponry with unparalleled destructive potential. A single large nuclear weapon could 
release explosive power comparable to all the energy released from the conventional weapons 
used in all past wars.’” MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 398 (quoting WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH 
SERVICES 7 (2d ed. 1987)); see also DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED 
NATIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY 7 (1991). 
 20. See also FRANCIS A. BOYLE ET AL., IN RE: MORE THAN 50,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(1991). See generally BURROUGHS, supra note 8. 
 21. Referring to the overall dangers, General Butler stated, 
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weapon policy, including preparedness for use.24 
 
“Despite all the evidence, we have yet to fully grasp the monstrous effect of these 
weapons, that the consequences of their use defy reason, transcending time and 
space, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants.” Nuclear weapons are “in-
herently dangerous, hugely expensive and militarily inefficient.” 
General Butler stated that “accepting nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of con-
flict condemns the world to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety. Worse, it 
codifies mankind’s most murderous instincts as an acceptable resort when other op-
tions for resolving conflict fail.” He added, “I have spent years studying nuclear 
weapons effects . . . have investigated a distressing array of accidents and incidents 
involving strategic weapons and forces . . . I came away from that experience deeply 
troubled by what I see as the burden of building and maintaining nuclear arse-
nals . . . the grotesquely destructive war plans, the daily operational risks, and the 
constant prospect of a crisis that would hold the fate of entire societies at risk.” 
MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 535 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Otto Kreisher, Retired Generals 
Urge End to Nuclear Arsenal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 5, 1996, at A1). 
 22. George Kennan, the distinguished American diplomat who originated the Cold War 
containment policy toward the Soviet Union, stated, 
The readiness to use nuclear weapons against other human beings – against people 
we do not know, whom we have never seen, and whose guilt or innocence is not for 
us to establish – and, in doing so, to place in jeopardy the natural structure upon 
which all civilization rests, as though the safety and perceived interests of our own 
generation were more important than everything that has taken place or could take 
place in civilization: this is nothing less than a presumption, a blasphemy, an indig-
nity – an indignity of monstrous dimensions – offered to God! 
ROCHE, supra note 11, at 13 (quoting GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE NUCLEAR DELUSION 206–
07 (1982)). 
 23. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 575–84. 
 24. The following helps illustrate the steps necessary to prepare a country to use nuclear 
weapons. 
Train military personnel to use nuclear weapons; conduct regular exercises reinforc-
ing the training; put the weapons and controls in the hands of the military person-
nel; provide them with contingency plans as to the circumstances in which they are 
to use the weapons; instill them with a sense of mission as to the lawful and signifi-
cant purposes of such weapons in upholding the national defense and honor; make 
them part of an elite corps; have them stand at the ready for decades at a time wait-
ing for the call; instill firm military discipline; make the weapons a publicly adver-
tised centerpiece of the nation’s military strategy; locate the weapons so as to leave 
them vulnerable to preemptive attack; villainize the enemy as godless and evil or as a 
rogue and terrorist nation; convey to military personnel that the weapons will be a 
major target of enemy attack and that it may be necessary to use them quickly before 
they can be destroyed; warn the enemy that, in the event of attack, the weapons may 
or will be used; inculcate in military personnel the notion of intra-war deterrence 
whereby nuclear weapons may need to be used following an enemy attack to deter 
further escalating attacks, give the military insufficient alternate conventional capac-
ity to defeat the enemy attack; cut numerous nuclear weapons bearing units and 
control centers off from each other and from contact with higher authorities; create 
a situation of hopelessness where the whole society is about to be destroyed, at least 
unless these weapons can be gotten off fast to destroy and restrain the enemy; give 
the President and other upper level command authorities only an imperfect under-
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Such difficulty may arise because the weapons’ effects actually 
outstrip our imagination.25 The proportion of the fireball in relation 
to the size of the nuclear device is very difficult to imagine. Their de-
structive capacity makes them awesome to contemplate,26 and the 
policies that generated the arsenals are not always amenable to com-
mon sense27 or our normal uses of language.28 
 
standing of the options and repercussions and accord them only 5 to 10 minutes, or 
even a matter of seconds, to decide, against the background of SIOP [Single Inte-
grated Operating Plan] based computer and other plans, decades in the making and 
ostensibly reflecting a broad historical consensus as to approach – do any number of 
these things, and the stage is set for the actual use of the nuclear weapons. 
Id. at 535–36. 
 25. The horror of a nuclear weapon’s actual affects are illustrated in the following: 
The fireball created by a nuclear explosion will be much hotter than the surface of 
the sun for fractions of a second and will radiate light and heat, as do all objects of 
very high temperature. Because the fireball is so hot and close to the earth, it will 
deliver enormous amounts of heat and light to the terrain surrounding the detona-
tion point, and it will be hundreds or thousands of times brighter than the sun at 
noon. If the fireball is created by the detonation of a 1-MT [megaton] nuclear 
weapon, for example, within roughly eight- to nine-tenths of a second each section 
of its surface will be radiating about three times as much heat and light as a compa-
rable area of the sun itself. The intense flash of light and heat from the explosion of 
a 550-KT weapon can carbonize exposed skin and cause clothing to ignite. At a 
range of three miles, for instance, surfaces would fulminate and recoil as they ema-
nate flames, and even particles of sand would explode like pieces of popcorn from 
the rapid heating of the fireball. At three and a half miles, where the blast pressure 
would be about 5psi, the fireball could ignite clothing on people, curtains and up-
holstery in homes and offices, and rubber tires on cars. At four miles, it could blister 
aluminum surfaces, and at six to seven miles it could still set fire to dry leaves and 
grass. This flash of incredibly intense, nuclear-driven sunlight could simultaneously 
set an uncountable number of fires over an area of close to 100 square miles. 
TURNER, supra note 7, app. A at 127–28. 
 26. REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 5, at 13 n.2. 
 27. Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency, describes his astonishment at a 1971 briefing in which it was argued that the United 
states needed to go from 27,000 nuclear warheads to 32,000: 
Common sense tells us that 27,000 nuclear warheads, let alone the peak of 32,500, 
far exceeded any conceivable need the United States could possibly have had. How 
unrealistic were such numbers? It would take 55 billion aircraft bombs, each bomb 
containing 500 pounds of TNT, to unleash as much energy as 32,500 nuclear war-
heads. To put this in perspective, each state in the union could be carpeted with 1 
billion bombs with 5 billion to spare – something quite beyond imagination. 
TURNER, supra note 7, at 9. 
 28. Noted expert Kosta Tsipis, (Retired) Director of the Program in Science and Tech-
nology for International Security of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in a “Fore-
word” to this extraordinarily comprehensive work, says, 
The very term “nuclear weapons” turns out to be an oxymoron. A weapon is a de-
vice, a tool used in combat, the commonest method for resolving conflict. More or 
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In 1995, the prestigious Canberra Commission,29 convened by 
the government of Australia, stated, 
The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is immense. Any use would 
be catastrophic. . . . There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the 
world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear 
weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject 
them, and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on 
their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need for self-
defence.30 
This Article attempts to address the issue in broad categories and 
in manners not often utilized in an effort to stimulate new think-
ing.31 
Part II emphasizes the ethical norm of the Golden Rule. Part III 
 
better weapons possession by one of the combatants allows him to create an asym-
metrical final state: a winner and a loser. The conflict is resolved, for a while anyway, 
by the winner imposing his will on the loser. But combat with nuclear weapons can-
not lead to an asymmetrical outcome: both combatants are equally destroyed. The 
final state is symmetrical; there is no winner and loser. So nuclear weapons cannot 
resolve conflict. Therefore, they are not weapons. 
Kosta Tsipsis, Foreward to MOXLEY, supra note 5, at xix. 
 29. See The Canberra Commission website at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/ 
cchome.html>. Roche comments on the formation of the Canberra Commission: 
In 1995, the (then) Labour government of Australia established the Canberra 
Commission, a group of seventeen distinguished world figures, to develop ideas and 
proposals for a concrete and realistic program to achieve a world totally free of nu-
clear weapons. Among the Commissioners: General Butler, former Commander-in-
Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (1991–1992) and the U.S. Strategic 
Command (1992–94) who was responsible for all the nuclear forces of the American 
Air Force and Navy; Field Marshall Lord Carver, former Chief of the British De-
fence Staff (1973–76); Robert McNamara, former American Secretary of Defense 
under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and Joseph Rotblat, President of the Pug-
wash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, who won the 1995 Nobel Peace 
Prize for his work on nuclear disarmament. The Canberra Commission’s report 
stated that, “Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to all humanity and its 
habitat,” and urged the nuclear states to immediately and “unequivocally” commit 
themselves to eliminating nuclear weapons, as “Such a commitment would propel 
the process in the most direct and imaginative way.” While getting to zero is the 
goal, the Commission pointed to a number of practical steps that should be taken 
immediately, such as taking nuclear forces off alert and removing warheads from de-
livery vehicles. 
ROCHE, supra note 11, at 53–55. 
 30. CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REPORT 
OF THE CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7 (1996). 
 31. As Albert Einstein said, “‘The unleashing of power of the atom bomb has changed 
everything except our mode of thinking, and thus we head toward unparalleled catastrophes.’” 
THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 184. 
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reminds us that nuclear weapons threaten our most precious, civi-
lized values expressed through law. Part IV succinctly states the 
holding of the International Court of Justice on the issue.32 Part V 
criticizes the incoherence of deterrence theory based on Interna-
tional Court of Justice opinions. The Conclusion is a plea to move 
towards moral coherence. Security policies are most effective when 
they are coherent with legal and moral foundations. 
II. ETHICAL AND MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUE 
The convergence of the development of global legal regimes 
with the nascent pursuit of global ethics33 may be where we can find 
the future thinking Albert Einstein said was necessary to address our 
current predicament.34 
In his concurrence with the historic opinion of the International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter the ICJ or the Court) issued July 8, 
1996, addressing the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons,35 Judge Ranjeva stated, “On the great issues of mankind 
the requirements of positive law and of ethics make common cause, 
and nuclear weapons, because of their destructive effects, are one 
such issue.”36 
Human society has ethical and moral norms based on wisdom, 
conscience, and practicality. Many norms are universal and have 
withstood the test of human experience over long periods of time. 
One such principle is that of reciprocity. It is often called the Golden 
Rule: “Treat others as you wish to be treated.” It is an ethical and 
moral foundation for all the world’s major religions.37 
 
 32. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Advisory 
Opinion of July 8). The full text of the opinion is available at the website of International As-
sociation of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, <http://www.ialana.org> and at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org> (The site contains verbatim oral testimonies as well as written sub-
missions). The historic importance of the opinion cannot be overemphasized for it is the first 
judicial analysis of the issue by this international tribunal even though the first General Assem-
bly Resolution, unanimously adopted January 24, 1946, at the London session, called for 
elimination of atomic weapons. 
 33. See ROCHE, supra note 4, at 118 n.8 (citing GLOBAL ETHIC (Hans Kung & Karl-
Josef Kushel eds., 1993)). 
 34. “Past thinking and methods did not prevent world wars. Future thinking must.” 
THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177. 
 35.  See generally Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. 
 36. Id. at 296 (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva). 
 37. Buddhism: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” UDANA-
VARGA, 5:18; Christianity: “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do 
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Judge Weeramantry said, 
[E]quality of all those who are subject to a legal system is central to 
its integrity and legitimacy. So it is with the body of principles con-
stituting the corpus of international law. Least of all can there be 
one law for the powerful and another law for the rest. No domestic 
system would accept such a principle, nor can any international sys-
tem which is premised on a concept of equality.38 
The solution: “States should treat others as they wish to be 
treated in return.”39 
Continued reliance on the role of nuclear weapons remains cen-
tral to the security postures of at least two declared nuclear weapon 
states for the foreseeable future.40 This posture generates instability. 
The Canberra Commission stated, 
 
you even so to them.” Matthew 7:12; Confucianism: “Do not unto others what you would 
not have them do unto you.” Analects 15:23; Hinduism: “This is the sum of duty: do not 
unto others that which would cause you pain if done to you.” Mahabharata 5:1517; Islam: 
“No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.” 
Hadith; Jainism: “In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as 
we regard our own self.” Lord Mahavir 24th Tirthankara; Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do 
not do to your fellow man. That is the law; all the rest is commentary.” Talmud, Shabbat 31a; 
Zoroastrianism: “That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatsoever is not 
good for its own self.” Dadistan-I-Dinik, 94:5. SOURCEBOOK OF THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS 
172–73 (Joel Beversluis ed., 2000). See also JEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RULE (1996) 
for an analysis of the Golden Rule from philosophic, religious, psychological, cultural, and 
ethical perspectives. 
 38. Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 526 
(separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry). 
 39. ROCHE, supra note 4, at 90. 
 40. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 491 (citing William Cohen, 1998 Annual Report to the 
President and Congress, Chapter 5: Strategic Nuclear Forces (visited Nov. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap5.html#top>). “For the foreseeable future, the 
United States must retain a robust triad of sufficient nuclear forces.” William Cohen, 2000 
Annual Report to the President and Congress, Chapter 1: The Defense Strategy (visited Nov. 20, 
2000) <http://www.dtic.mil.execsec/adr2000/chapt1.html>. See also U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 3-12: DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS v 
(1995) [hereinafter DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS]. “Credible and capable 
nuclear forces are essential for national security.” Id.; see also National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation (Information Dep’t of the Russian Federation Embassy in India ed., Dec. 
17, 1997) (endorsed by the Russian Federation President’s Decree No. 1300) (on file with 
author). “The main task of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is to insure nuclear 
deterrence, which is to prevent both a nuclear and conventional large scale or regional war, and 
also to meet its allied commitments.” Id. at 1. France, the United Kingdom, and China with 
much smaller arsenals have made it clear that they will not fundamentally abandon deterrence 
and contemplate cutting their arsenals until Russia and the United states come down to very 
low numbers. See ROCHE, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
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Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that 
these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve 
uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is 
highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. 
The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimu-
lus to other states to acquire them.41 
It is inconsistent with moral wisdom and practical common sense 
for a few states to violate the ancient and universally valid principle of 
reciprocity. Such moral myopia has a corrosive effect on the law, 
which gains its respect largely through moral coherence. Global se-
curity cannot be obtained while rejecting wisdom universally recog-
nized for thousands of years. 
III. LAW AND VALUES 
Law is the articulation of values. Values must be based on moral 
foundations to have credibility. The recognition of the intrinsic sa-
credness of life and the duty of states and individuals to protect life is 
a fundamental characteristic of all human civilized values. Such civi-
lized values are expressed in humanitarian law and customs that have 
an ancient lineage reaching back thousands of years. 
They were worked out in many civilizations—Chinese, Indian, 
Greek, Roman, Japanese, Islamic, modern European, among oth-
ers. . . . Humanitarian law is in continuous development. . . . [and] 
grows as the sufferings of war keep escalating. With the nuclear 
weapon, those sufferings reach a limit situation, beyond which all 
else is academic.42 
 
 41. See CANBERRA COMMISSION, supra note 30, at 7. See also Neil Joeck, Nuclear Re-
lations in South Asia, in REPAIRING THE REGIME, supra note 5, at 132–33, for a description of 
the tragic change of status of Pakistan and India in 1998. 
A group of sixty–one former generals and admirals from seventeen countries, includ-
ing United States and Russia, declared in December, 1996 . . . [the following:] 
We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our 
countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weap-
ons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these 
weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and 
survival of the people we are dedicated to protect. 
ROCHE, supra note 11, at 55. 
 42. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 443–44 (separate opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry). 
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In his 1995 testimony before the Court, then Foreign Minister 
of Australia Gareth Evans said, 
The fact remains that the existence of nuclear weapons as a class of 
weapons threatens the whole of civilization. This is not the case 
with respect to any class or classes of conventional weapons. It can-
not be consistent with humanity to permit the existence of a 
weapon which threatens the very survival of humanity. The threat 
of global annihilation engendered by the existence of such weap-
ons, and the fear that this has engendered amongst the entire post-
war generation, is itself an evil, as much as nuclear war itself. If not 
always at the forefront of our everyday thinking, the shadow of the 
mushroom cloud remains in all our minds. It has pervaded our 
thoughts about the future, about our children, about human na-
ture. And it has pervaded the thoughts of our children themselves, 
who are deeply anxious about their future in a world where nuclear 
weapons remain.43 
We must never forget the awesome destructive power of these 
devices. “Nuclear weapons have the potential to destroy the entire 
eco system of the planet. Those already in the world’s arsenals have 
the potential of destroying life on the planet several times over.”44 
Not only are they destructive in magnitude but in horror as 
well.45 It is questionable whether there is a full recognition of the 
 
 43. Gareth Evans of Australia, Verbatim Record, 30 Oct. 1995, 42, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_cr/iUNAN_iCR9522_19951030. 
PDF>. 
 44. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 454 (separate opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry); see also BURROUGHS, supra note 8, at 90–91; ROCHE, supra note 11, at 3–13. 
 45. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 454 (separate opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry). Judge Weeramantry lists the destructive horror caused by nuclear weapons: 
Nuclear weapons 
1. cause death and destruction; 
2. induce cancers, leukemia, keloids and related afflictions; 
3. cause gastrointestinal, cardiovascular and related afflictions; 
4. continue for decades after their use to induce the health related problems men-
tioned above; 
5. damage the environmental rights of future generations; 
6. cause congenital deformities, mental retardation and genetic damage; 
7. carry the potential to cause a nuclear winter; 
8. contaminate and destroy the food chain; 
9. imperil the ecosystem; 
10.  produce lethal levels of heat and blast; 
11.  produce radiation and radioactive fallout; 
12.  produce a disruptive electromagnetic pulse;  
13.  produce social disintegration; 
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consequences of the horror.46 Judge Weeramantry emphasized that 
the unprecedented magnitude of its destructive power is only one 
of the unique features of the bomb. It is unique in its uncontain-
ability in both space and time. It is unique as a source of peril to 
the human future. It is unique as a source of continuing danger to 
human health, even long after its use. Its infringement of 
humanitarian law goes beyond its being a weapon of mass  
 
 
14.  imperil all civilization; 
15.  threaten human survival; 
16.  wreak cultural devastation; 
17.  span a time range of thousands of years; 
18.  threaten all life on the planet; 
19.  irreversibly damage the rights of future generations; 
20.  exterminate civilian populations; 
21.  damage neighbouring states; 
22.  produce psychological stress and fear syndromes as no other weapons do. 
Id. at 471–72 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry). 
 46. Takashi Hiraoka, Mayor of Hiroshima, told the Court: 
The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki shattered all war precedent. 
The mind-numbing damage these nuclear weapons wrought shook the foundations 
of human existence. . . . 
The dropping of the nuclear weapons is a problem that must be addressed globally. 
History is written by the victors. Thus, the heinous massacre that was Hiroshima has 
been handed down to us as a perfectly justified act of war. 
As a result, for over 50 years we have never directly confronted the full implications 
of this horrifying act for the future of the human race. Hence, we are still forced to 
live under the enormous threat of nuclear weapons . . . . 
Beneath the atomic bomb’s monstrous mushroom cloud, human skin was burned 
raw. Crying for water, human beings died in desperate agony. With thoughts of 
these victims as the starting point, it is incumbent upon us to think about the nu-
clear age and the relationship between human beings and nuclear weapons . . . . 
The unique characteristic of the atomic bombing was that the enormous destruction 
was instantaneous and universal. Old, young, male, female, soldier, civilian – the kill-
ing was utterly indiscriminate. The entire city was exposed to the compound and 
devastating effects of thermal rays, shock wave blast, and radiation . . . . 
Above all, we must focus on the fact that the human misery caused by the atomic 
bomb is different from that caused by conventional weapons. [H]uman bodies were 
burned by the thermal rays and high-temperature fires, broken and lacerated by the 
blast, and insidiously attacked by radiation. These forms of damage compounded 
and amplified each other, and the name given to the combination was “A-bomb dis-
ease . . . .” 
[T]he bomb reduced Hiroshima to an inhuman state utterly beyond human ability 
to express or imagine. I feel frustrated at not being able to express this completely in 
my testimony about the tragedy of the atomic bombing . . . . 
It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder 
that leaves survivors to suffer for decades, is a violation of international law. 
BURROUGHS, supra note 8, at 90–91. 
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destruction, to reasons which penetrate far deeper into the core of 
humanitarian law.47 
Like a deer stunned by oncoming headlights and unable to 
move, we have not adequately grasped the moral incoherence of 
placing the survival of states “above all other considerations, in par-
ticular above the survival of mankind itself.”48 
Our collective failure to use laws guided by ethical values rele-
gates us to live in a 
kind of suspended sentence. For half a century now these terrifying 
weapons of mass destruction have formed part of the human condi-
tion. Nuclear weapons have entered into all calculations, all scenar-
ios, all plans. Since Hiroshima, on the morning of 6 August 1945, 
fear has gradually become man’s first nature. His life on earth has 
taken on the aspect of what the Koran calls “a long nocturnal jour-
ney,” like a nightmare whose end he cannot yet foresee.49 
Attempting to obtain ultimate security through the ultimate 
weapon, we have failed, for 
the proliferation of nuclear firepower has still not been brought 
under control, despite the existence of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Fear and folly may still link hands at any moment to per-
form a final dance of death. Humanity is all the more vulnerable 
today for being capable of mass producing nuclear missiles.50 
We are challenged as never before; technology continues to slip 
away from moral guidance; and law chases after common sense. The 
power of law must match the power of our weapons.51 The  
 
 47. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 453 (separate opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry). 
 48. Id. at 273 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 49. Id. at 268 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 50. Id. at 269 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 51. Judge Weeramantry stated, 
Before 1945 “the highest explosive effect of bombs was produced by TNT devices 
of about 20 tons.” The nuclear weapons exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
more or less of the explosive power of 15 and 12 kilotons respectively, i.e., 15,000 
and 12,000 tons of TNT (trinitrotoluene) respectively. Many of the weapons exist-
ing today and in process of being tested represent several multiples of the explosive 
power of these bombs. Bombs in the megaton (equivalent to a million tons of TNT) 
and multiple megaton range are in the world’s nuclear arsenals, some being even in 
excess of 20 megatons (equivalent to 20 million tons of TNT). A one-megaton 
bomb, representing the explosive power of a million tons of TNT, would be around  
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International Court of Justice in July of 1996 attempted to do just 
that. 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Article 92 of the United Nations Charter establishes the Interna-
tional Court of Justice as the principle judicial organ in the United 
Nations system, mandated to settle legal disputes submitted to it by 
states in accordance with international law and to give advisory opin-
ions on legal issues at the request of the United Nations General As-
sembly, the Security Council, or U.N. specialized agencies. Conven-
ing at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Court is composed of 15 
judges elected by the U.N. to nine-year terms of office.52 
In 1992, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nu-
clear War at the Assembly of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), a U.N. specialized agency, promoted a resolution to ask the 
ICJ the following question: “In view of the health and environ-
mental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or 
 
70 times the explosive power of the bombs used on Japan, and a 20-megaton bomb 
well over a thousand times that explosive power. 
Since the mind is numbed by such abstract figures and cannot comprehend them, 
they have been graphically concretised in various ways. One of them is to picture the 
quantity of TNT represented by a single one-megaton bomb, in terms of its trans-
port by rail. It has been estimated that this would require a train two hundred miles 
long. When one is carrying death and destruction to an enemy in war through the 
use of a single one-megaton bomb, it assists the comprehension of this phenomenon 
to think in terms of a 200-mile train loaded with TNT being driven into enemy ter-
ritory, to be exploded there. It cannot be said that international law would consider 
this legal. Nor does it make any difference if the train is not 200 miles long, but 
100 miles, 50 miles, 10 miles, or only 1 mile. Nor, again, could it matter if the train 
is 1000 miles long, as would be the case with a 5-megaton bomb, or 4000 miles 
long, as would be the case with a 20-megaton bomb. 
Such is the power of the weapon upon which the Court is deliberating—power 
which dwarfs all historical precedents, even if they are considered cumulatively. A 
5-megaton weapon would represent more explosive power than all of the bombs 
used in World War II and a twenty-megaton bomb “more than all of the explosives 
used in all of the wars in the history of mankind.” 
Id. at 452–53 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (footnotes omitted). 
 52. For advisory statutes of the Court, see U.N. CHARTER, art. 96 and I.C.J. STATUTE, 
art. 65. For the U.S. position on granting advisory jurisdiction to the ICJ, see M. 
POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT AS A ‘SUPREME COURT OF 
NATIONS’: DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND DISILLUSION 175–91 (1996). See also BURROUGHS, su-
pra note 8, at 11. Because Judge Andres Aguilar Mawdsley of Venezuela died shortly before 
the hearings on nuclear weapons, the Court’s President Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria 
was authorized to cast a tie-breaking vote. 
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other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under interna-
tional law including the WHO Constitution?”53 This question was 
adopted by the WHO in 1993 and submitted to the ICJ.54 
Simultaneously, a coalition of civic organizations known as the 
World Court Project, led by the International Association of Lawyers 
Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA),55 lobbied for the U.N. General 
Assembly to adopt a resolution posing the broader question: “Is the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted un-
der international law?”56 In 1993, the Resolution was placed before 
the U.N. General Assembly. The United States, Britain, and France 
made diplomatic forays to the capitals of many nonaligned countries 
threatening trade reductions if the Resolution was not opposed. The 
Resolution was withdrawn.57 
However, in 1994, the Resolution was reintroduced and, on 15 
December 1994, adopted.58 The former Director of the U.N. Dis-
armament Office, William Epstein, described that vote as “‘the most 
exciting night in the UN in 30 years,’ . . . yet, there was almost no 
coverage of the drama in the Western media.”59 
Robert Green, in the Naked Nuclear Emperor, described the sub-
sequent process: 
The Court received 28 written submissions from governments. In 
addition, it held Oral Proceedings from 30 October – 15 Novem-
ber 1995, at which 22 governments made statements, of which 16 
argued for illegality. The US, UK, France and Russia (China took 
no part) were supported only by Germany and Italy in arguing for 
 
 53. See ROCHE, supra note 11, at 42. 
 54. See W.H.A. Res. 46.40, U.N. W.H.O., 46th Sess. (1993) (available in 
BURROUGHS, supra note 8, app. C at 157–58); see also World Health Organization, Request 
for an Advisory Opinion Transmitted to the Court under the World Health Organization Resolu-
tion of May 14, 1993, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2000) <http://www.icj-ij.org/icjwww/icases/ianw/ianwframe.htm>. For in-
formation regarding the Court’s rejection of the request on jurisdictional grounds, see Legality 
of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 68 (Advisory Opin-
ion of July 8). 
 55. See International Association of Lawyers’ Against Nuclear Arms website at 
<http://www.ialana.org>. 
 56. ROCHE, supra note 11, at 43. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Request for an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. GAOR (1997) (available in BURROUGHS, supra 
note 8, app. D at 159–60); see also Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 226. 
 59. ROCHE, supra note 11, at 44. 
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the Court to use its discretion not to answer the question. In all, 
45 states and the World Health Organisation gave evidence, over 
twice the participation in a case in the Court’s history. In addition, 
nearly 4 million individual Declarations of Public Conscience were 
presented to the Court in support of the case – the first time it had 
accepted “citizens’ evidence.” 
After seven months’ deliberation, the Court gave its decision on 8 
July 1996. It accepted the UN General Assembly’s question, and 
gave a 34-page main Advisory Opinion, plus over 200 pages of 
separate statements and dissenting opinions by each of the 14 
judges.60 
The nuclear weapon states, in essence, argued that deterrence 
stabilizes the international system.61 The United Kingdom, for ex-
ample, asked the Court not to remove the “veil of constructive si-
lence” over the debate of the legality of nuclear weapons. The 
United States argued that modern delivery systems are capable of 
precise strikes, and, therefore, the legality of a nuclear weapon 
should be addressed in specific instances and not in the abstract.62 
The Court held in relevant part that “the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules 
of humanitarian law” and that states are obligated to bring to a con-
clusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.63 
 
 60. ROBERT GREEN, THE NAKED NUCLEAR EMPEROR: DEBUNKING NUCLEAR 
DETERRENCE  63 (2000). Portions of the text are available at the website <http://www.dis-
armsecure/publications/books.org>. 
 61. See BURROUGHS, supra note 8, app. A at 84–156, for an excellent analysis of the 
states’ arguments to the Court. 
 62. ROCHE, supra note 11, at 46–47. 
 63. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 266–67. The Response (Disposi-
tif) to the General Assembly of the United Nations question reads: 
THE COURT: 
(1) By thirteen votes to one, Decides to comply with the request for an advisory 
opinion; 
IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Guillaume, Sha-
habuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; AGAINST: Judge Oda. 
(2) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly: 
A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law 
any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; 
B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional  
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The decision failed to resolve several questions, such as: Did the 
Court open the way for permissible uses of a nuclear weapon by say-
ing that it is “generally” illegal and that it could not say that there 
would never be an attack on a country that threatened its very exis-
tence to which nuclear weapons would be necessarily an illegal re-
sponse? Did the Court acknowledge that there were conceivably hy-
pothetically legally compliant uses? 
It quoted the United Kingdom’s statement that “‘in some cases, 
such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the 
High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible to en-
visage a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few civilian casu-




international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons as such; 
IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, 
Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; 
AGAINST: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma. 
C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is con-
trary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet 
all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful; 
D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with 
the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly 
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with 
specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with 
nuclear weapons; 
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote, 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; How-
ever, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at 
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake; 
IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, 
Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo; AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guil-
laume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins. 
F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a 
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control. 
Id. For full opinion and commentary, see NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ILLEGAL, supra note 32. 
For an analysis with excellent bibliography on the opinion, see BURROUGHS, supra note 8. The 
opinion is available at cost from the UN (document A/51/218, 15 Oct. 1996), UN Publica-
tions, 2 UN Plaza, DC2-853, NY, NY 10017, 212-963-8302. 
 64. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 261 (citation omitted). 
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demonstrated when even such a limited use would be justifiable or 
“feasible.”65 
The Court ruled unanimously that nuclear weapons must, in any 
and all instances, obey humanitarian laws of war.66 Can our most ba-
sic moral judgments, founded on “‘dictates of public conscience’” 
and “‘elementary considerations of humanity,’” which remain “fun-
damental” and “intransgressible,” be squared with these devices?67 It 
seems scarcely reasonable with respect to these humanitarian legal 
requirements that they can.68 
The Court stated unequivocally that the rules of armed conflict, 
including humanitarian law,69 prohibit the use of any weapon that is 
likely to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants;70 that is incapa-
ble of distinguishing between civilian and military targets;71 that vio-
lates principles protecting neutral states (such as through fall-out or 
nuclear winter);72 that is not a proportional response to an attack;73 
 
 65. See id. at 262. 
 66. See id. at 266. 
 67. See id. at 257. 
 68. See id. at 262–63. 
 69. The United States appears to have an ambiguous position regarding humanitarian 
law. The United States Air Force manual on International Law quotes the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The Armed Forces of the United States have benefited from, and highly 
value, the humanitarianism encompassed by the laws of war. Many are alive today only because 
of the mutual restraint imposed by these rules, notwithstanding the fact that the rules have 
been applied imperfectly.” MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 769 n.175 (quoting THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE CONDUCT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 1-8 to 1-9 (1976) (citations omitted)). Notwithstanding 
such praise of humanitarian law, presently 
[t]he U.S. position is that it is entitled to target civilians in circumstances when re-
prisals are appropriate. U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the Staff 
Judge Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, in a 
1997 article, stated: 
Legal advisors should likewise be aware that while the U.S. does not target 
populations per se, it reserves the right to do so under the limited circum-
stances of belligerent reprisal. The U.S. (along with other declared nuclear 
powers) insists that Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions does not apply to 
nuclear weapons. Hence, prohibitions contained in Protocol I forbidding repri-
sals against civilians are not, in the U.S. view, applicable to nuclear operations. 
MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 448 n.4 (quoting Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Taming Shiva: Apply-
ing International Law to Nuclear Operations, 42 A.F.L. Rev. 157, 163 (1997) (citations 
omitted)). 
 70. See Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 257, 262–63. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. at 257. 
 73. See id. 
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or that does permanent damage to the environment.74 
Under no circumstance may states make civilians the object of at-
tack, nor can they use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing 
between civilian and military targets. These limitations continue to 
hold regardless of whether the survival of a state, acting in self-
defense, is at stake. 
For this reason, the President Judge stated in forceful terms that 
the Court’s inability to go beyond its statement “can in no way be 
interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to the recognition 
of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”75 He empha-
sized his point by stating that nuclear weapons are “the ultimate evil 
and destabilize humanitarian law which is the law of the lesser evil. The 
very existence of nuclear weapons is therefore a major challenge to the 
very existence of humanitarian law.”76 
The Court held that no formal testimony was presented that nu-
clear weapons can meet the humanitarian law requirements for their 
use.77 
The President Judge said, “Atomic warfare and humanitarian 
law therefore appear to be mutually exclusive, the existence of one 
automatically implying the non-existence of the other.”78 The Court 
said, 
[M]ethods and means of warfare, which would preclude any dis-
tinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result 
in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of 
the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons . . . the use of such 
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such 
requirements.79 
Discordance between the incompatibility of these devices with 
the requirements of humanitarian law, the assertion that there could 
be possible instances in which their use could be legal, and the reli-
ance on the doctrine of deterrence compelled the Court to seek a 
resolution: “the long-promised complete nuclear disarmament ap-
 
 74. See id. at 242–44. 
 75. Id. at 270 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 76. Id. at 272 (separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 77. See id. at 261–63. 
 78. Id. at 273 (separate declaration of Judge Bedjaoui). 
 79. Id. at 262. 
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pears to be the most appropriate means of achieving that result.”80 
The requirements of moral coherence and ethical conduct and the 
need for “international law, and with it the stability of the interna-
tional order which it is intended to govern,”81 drive the imperative of 
nuclear disarmament. 
V. THE ON-GOING PROBLEM OF DETERRENCE 
Legal and moral questions engendered by the threat of massive 
destruction and injury to the innocent, the environment, and future 
generations continue to loom before us. We are not faced with nu-
clear policies founded on a strategy of dropping depth charges in 
mid-ocean or bombs in the desert. Nuclear weapons policy82 is based 
on deterrence,83 with its reliance on the horrific destruction of vast 
numbers of innocent people and the destruction of the environment, 
rendering the world hostile to generations yet to be blessed with 
life.84 
Nuclear deterrence theory is based on raising the cost of an ad-
versary’s actions to unacceptably high levels through utilizing the 
threat of nuclear attack to deter an unwanted action.85 The value of 
nuclear weapons is their ability to influence conduct without being  
 
 80. Id. at 263. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 469. U.S. nuclear contingency planning is set forth in 
the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP). It is a highly secret blueprint for the use of nu-
clear weapons in conflict, stored on three floors of mainframe computers at U.S. Strategic Air 
Command. SIOP currently contemplates a wide variety of actions. Experts speculate that the 
current plan includes options from one demonstration attack with one weapon to more than 
600 missile strikes of nearly 3,000 warheads in less than one half an hour. Id. at 470. See also 
Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1998, 55 BULL. OF 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 78 (1999). Decisions regarding use of nuclear weapons are done under 
the explicit decision of the President integrated with U.S. Strategic Command, by combatant 
commanders as to the specific selection of targets pursuant to the Joint Nuclear Operations 
Manual. See DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 40. 
  The Manual boldly asserts that for deterrence against large-scale aggression against 
the U.S. and its allies to be effective there must be real-force capacities and “national determi-
nation to use those forces.” As Charles Moxley so well puts it, “‘nuclear war-fighting’ theory is 
alive and well in U.S. military planning.” MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 479. 
 83. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 479. For an excellent analysis of nuclear deterrence 
theory, see also GREEN, supra note 60, at 14–19. See also ROBERT JERVIS, THE ILLOGIC OF 
AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY (1984). 
 84. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 127–34; see also BURROUGHS, supra note 8, at 90–91. 
 85. See GREEN, supra note 60, at 14–19. 
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exploded.86 Senator Douglas Roche, former Canadian Ambassador 
for Disarmament, contextualized our historic predicament in The Ul-
timate Evil: 
The doctrine of nuclear deterrence became the basic military strat-
egy of both Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. Under 
nuclear deterrence, both sides profess to have enough firepower to 
launch a successful retaliatory strike after taking the first nuclear 
blow of the opponent. The aggressor’s destruction is thus assured, 
the elemental fact that keeps the aggressor from striking in the first 
place. In the event of a nuclear exchange, the strategy of nuclear 
deterrence leads to mutual assured destruction: thus the famous ac-
ronym MAD.87 
The ultimate evil becomes an ultimate irony: value based on 
non-use. Yet, nuclear deterrence remains “central to U.S. nuclear 
posture.”88 
Deterrence proponents claim that nuclear weapons are not so 
much instruments for the waging of war but political instruments 
“intended to prevent war by depriving it of any possible rationale.”89 
The United States has boldly argued that because deterrence is be-
lieved to be essential to its international security the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons must therefore be legal. The United States represen-
tative stated, 
 
 86. Potential enemies face a menu of nuclear responses to threats. This menu is de-
signed to deter aggression and includes: deterrence, extended deterrence, mutual-assured de-
struction, first strike or first use, second strike capability, preemptive strike, counter-force 
strike, counter-value strike, counter-varying strategy. For a clear explanation of each nuanced 
policy, see MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 447–51. 
 87. ROCHE, supra note 11, at 9; see also MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 447–48 n.4; Brigid 
Schulte, A Timeline of the Nuclear Age, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995. 
In February 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reflected the American 
policy of MAD: “A full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the 
USSR would kill 100 million Americans during the first hour. It would kill an even 
greater number of Russians, but I doubt that any sane person would call this ‘vic-
tory.’’’ 
Id. 
 88. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 477. However, Former Secretary of Defense Perry has 
stated that the U.S. now pursues Mutual Assured Safety (MAS), based on leading and reducing 
nuclear arsenals and hedging against political changes in Russia by on-going preparedness to 
reconstitute nuclear forces. The substantive changes from Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD), with respect to Russia, however, remain largely inchoate. See id.; see also WILLIAM 
PERRY, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 213–15 (1996). 
 89. BURROUGHS, supra note 8, at 133 (quoting Marc Perrinde Brichambaut, France, 
Verbatim record (trans.) Nov. 1, 1995, 33). 
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If these weapons could not lawfully be used in individual or collec-
tive self-defense under any circumstances, there would be no credi-
ble threat of such use in response to aggression and deterrent poli-
cies would be futile and meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible 
to separate the policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of 
the means of deterrence. Accordingly, any affirmation of a general 
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons would be directly con-
trary to one of the fundamental premises of the national security 
policy of each of these many States.90 
Nuclear deterrence doctrine is based on threatening massive de-
struction; such destruction would most certainly violate numerous 
principles of humanitarian law.91 The Court emphasized the forego-
ing by stating, “[I]f the use of force itself in a given case is illegal—
for whatever reason—the threat to use such force will likewise be il-
legal.”92 “If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the re-
quirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use 
would also be contrary to that law.”93 
Even in the instance of retaliation, the moral absurdity challenges 
us. As Mexico’s Ambassador Sergio Gonzalez Galvez told the Court, 
“Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass rape 
acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is retaliatory 
deterrence—‘You burnt my city, I will burn yours.’”94 
Professor Eric David, on behalf of the Solomon Islands, stated, 
If the dispatch of a nuclear weapon causes a million deaths, retalia-
tion with another nuclear weapon which will also cause a million 
deaths will perhaps protect the sovereignty of the state suffering the 
 
 90. Michael Matheson, US, Verbatim record, Nov. 15, 1995, 62–63, (emphasis added) 
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_cr/iUNAN_iCR9534_ 
19951115.PDF>. 
 91.  
The nuclear weapon is, in many ways, the negation of the humanitarian considera-
tion underlying the law applicable in armed conflict and of the principle of neutral-
ity. The nuclear weapon cannot distinguish between civilian and military targets. It 
causes immeasurable suffering. The radiation released by it is unable to respect the 
territorial integrity of a neutral state. 
MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 181 (quoting Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 
at 306 (separate opinion of Judge Fleischauer)). 
 92. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 246. 
 93. Id. at 257. 
 94. Gonzalez Galvez, Mexico, Verbatim record, Nov. 3, 1995, 51 available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_cr/iUNAN_iCR9525_19951103. 
PDF>. 
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first strike, and will perhaps satisfy the victim’s desire for revenge, 
but it will not satisfy humanitarian law, which will have been 
breached not once but twice; and two wrongs do not make a 
right.95 
Judge Weeramantry rigorously analyzed deterrence theory. On 
intention, he stated, 
Deterrence needs to carry the conviction to other parties that there 
is a real intention to use those weapons in the event of an attack by 
that other party. A game of bluff does not convey that intention, 
for it is difficult to persuade another of one’s intention unless one 
really has that intention. Deterrence thus consists in a real intention 
to use such weapons. If deterrence is to operate, it leaves the world 
of make-believe and enters the field of seriously intended military 
threats.96 
On deterrence and mere possession, he stated, 
Deterrence is more than the mere accumulation of weapons in a 
storehouse. It means the possession of weapons in a state of readi-
ness for actual use. This means the linkage of weapons ready for 
immediate take off, with a command and control system geared for 
immediate action. It means that weapons are attached to delivery 
vehicles. It means that personnel are ready night and day to render 
them operational at a moment’s notice. There is clearly a vast dif-
ference between weapons stocked in a warehouse and weapons so 
readied for immediate action. Mere possession and deterrence are 
thus concepts which are clearly distinguishable from each other.97 
For deterrence to work, one must have the resolve to cause the 
resulting damage and devastation. 
Is deterrence limited to depth charges in the ocean or strikes in 
the desert? Are we willing to permit global security to rely on a bluff? 
If it is not a lie but a resolve to be willing to destroy so much, are we 
not reducing humanitarian law to being a mere servant of raw 




 95. BURROUGHS, supra note 8, at 108 (quoting Eric David, Solomon Islands, Verbatim 
record, (trans.), Nov. 14, 1995, 45). 
 96. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 540 (separate opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry). 
 97. Id. 
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While deterrence continues to place all life on the planet in a 
precarious position of high risk, one must wonder whether it pro-
vides any possible security against accidental or unauthorized 
launches, computer error, irrational rogue actions, terrorist attack, 
criminal syndicate utilization of weapons, and other irrational and 
unpredictable,98 but likely, scenarios. 
Did the Court undermine the continued legitimacy of deter-
rence? The Court stated clearly that “if the use of force itself in a 
given case is illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such 
force will likewise be illegal.”99 
The moral position of the nuclear weapon states is essentially that 
the threat to commit an illegal act—massive destruction of innocent 
people—is legal because it is so horrible to contemplate that it en-
sures the peace. Thus the argument is that the threat of committing 
that which is patently illegal is made legal by its own intrinsic illogic. 
The reliance on the value of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence 
impedes progress in moving towards the elimination of nuclear 
weapons.100 An unambiguous political commitment by the nuclear 
weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons, evidenced by unambi-
guous immediate pledges never to use them first as well as placing 
the weapons in a de-alerted posture pending their ultimate elimina-
tion, will promptly evidence the good faith efforts by the nuclear 
weapon states to reduce our collective risks. These steps increase our 
collective security but are hardly enough to meet the clear decision 
of the Court and the dictates of reason. Only good faith multilateral 
negotiations leading to elimination of these devices will bring law, 
morals, ethics, and reason into coherence. Only then will we be able 
to tell our children that ultimate violence will not bring ultimate se-
curity. Ultimate security results from a culture of peace based on law, 
reason, and values. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We are heartened by the level of cooperation articulated in the 
integrated human security agendas that emerged from the world 
summits of the 1990’s, which addressed our common environmental 
 
 98. Chuck Hansen has compiled an “Oops List” of nuclear accidents, which is available 
on the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ website at <http://www.bullatomsci.org>. 
 99. Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 246. 
 100. MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 447–51. 
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and human security concerns:101 The World Summit for Children in 
New York in 1990;102 The World Conference on Environment and 
Development (Earth Summit) in Rio in 1992;103 The World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993;104 The International 
 
 101. For an excellent description of the World Summits set forth in the year-end briefing 
paper, see UN BRIEFING PAPERS, THE WORLD CONFERENCES: FOR DEVELOPING PRIORITIES 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Dep’t of Public Info., United Nations ed., 1997) [hereinafter UN 
BRIEFING PAPERS]. See also ROCHE, supra note 4, at 68–71. See generally World Summit for 
Children, U.N. Doc. A/45/625 (1990). 
 102.  
The World Summit for Children in New York in 1990 issued a convention on the 
Rights of the Child and set goals for reducing deaths, malnutrition, disease and dis-
ability among the children of the developing world. Already 89 countries have 
reached the end decade target of over 90% immunization coverage, and the 
achievement of the goal of the eradication of polio . . . is in sight. 
Jonathan Granoff, Awakening Global Family Values, in INDIA, NUCLEAR WEAPONS & 
GLOBAL SECURITY 19 (1998); see also UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101.  
  There has been a dramatic improvement in the management of diarrhea saving the 
lives of at least a million children annually. The program for iodine deficiency control has led 
to over 1.5 billion more people consuming iodized salt in 1995 than in 1990, and, as a result, 
12 million infants are protected from mental retardation each year. The population without 
access to safe drinking water has fallen by about one third, helping over a billion people. See id. 
 103.  
The World Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio 
in 1992 produced a Biodiversity Convention, a Global Warming Convention, a 
Statement on Forest Principles, a Declaration on Environment and Development, 
and Agenda 21. The last is a blueprint for the sustainable development of the planet 
into the 21st century. 
Granoff, supra note 102, at 19; see also UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101. The imperative 
of a rule of law governing sustainable development and a business environment will obviously 
take an enormous shift in the attitude of our leaders. The interdependence of the world’s eco-
nomic system bodes well that cooperative efforts could bear fruit rapidly when the political will 
is harnessed. In the same way as a village must cooperate to protect its commons, we will need 
far higher levels of international cooperation to address the problems of ozone depletion, 
global warming, and water pollution that continue to grow in seriousness. Nevertheless, 
Agenda 21 remains the only globally accepted comprehensive outline to respond to our plane-
tary crisis. See id. An interpretive guide to Agenda 21, The Global Partnership for Environment 
and Development is available from the UN (UN Sales No. E.93.I.9.). 
 104.  
The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 adopted a Declaration 
and Programme of Action, including the establishment of the office of UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, designed to strengthen human rights around the 
world. The Vienna Declaration set forth the universality, indivisibility, and interde-
pendence of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as the birthright of 
all human beings and the first responsibility of governments. 
Granoff, supra note 102, at 19. It clarified the essential relationship between development, 
democracy, and the promotion of human rights. Despite sensitivity regarding respect for na-
tional sovereignty principles, it was agreed that within the framework of the purposes and prin-
cipals of the charter of the U.N. the promotion and protection of human rights is a legitimate 
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Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994;105 
The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 
1994;106 The Conference on Climate Change in Berlin in 1995;107 
The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 
1995;108 and The City Summit (Habitat II) in June 1996.109 How-
 
international community concern. “The emergence of an international criminal court can be 
indirectly attributed to the institutional momentum generated by this conference.” Id.; see also 
UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101; The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993). 
 105. “The International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 
shifted the previous emphasis on demography and population control to sustainable develop-
ment and recognition of the need for universal reproductive health care and reproductive 
rights. Its declaration emphasized the empowerment of women, appreciation for pluralistic 
values and religious beliefs, reaffirmation of the central role of the family, and the needs of ado-
lescents.” Granoff, supra note 102, at 19; see also Declaration of International Conference on 
Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 171/13(1995). 
 106.  
The World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1994 brought to-
gether 117 heads of state to issue a political Declaration and Programme of Action 
to alleviate and reduce poverty (including the eradication of absolute poverty), ex-
pand productive employment, and enhance social integration. In many ways, the so-
cial summit is the centerpiece of the global conferences of the 1990’s. The Summit 
Declaration set forth 10 commitments each followed by specific recommendations 
for action at national and international levels. 
Granoff, supra note 102, at 19. They include, in part: the eradication of poverty in the world, 
with policies addressing the root causes of poverty giving special attention to the needs of 
women and children and other vulnerable and disadvantaged; the promotion of full employ-
ment and social integration by fostering social stability and justice based on nondiscrimination, 
tolerance, and the protection of human rights; the achievement of equality and equity between 
women and men; the promotion of universal and equitable access to quality education and 
health care; the acceleration of the economic, social, and human resource development of Af-
rica and the least-developed countries through the promotion of democratic institutions and 
addressing problems such as external debt, economic reform, food security, and commodity 
diversification. See UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101. 
 107. “The Conference on Climate Change in Berlin in 1995 started a process to limit 
and reduce emission of greenhouse gases within specified time frames, such as 2005, 2010, and 
2020.” Granoff, supra note 102, at 19; see also UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101; Dep’t 
of Public Info., United Nations, Press Release HR/888 (Apr. 12, 1995) (on file with author). 
 108. “The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995 produced 
a comprehensive plan, the ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,’ for the international 
community to promote the status of women to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole.” 
Granoff, supra note 102, at 20. Twelve critical areas of concern are dealt with in depth: pov-
erty, education, health, violence against women, armed conflict, economic structures, power 
sharing and decision-making, mechanisms to promote the advancement of women, human 
rights, the media, the environment, and the girl child. It redefined women’s rights as human 
rights, asserting women’s rights to “have control over and decide freely and responsibly on 
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, 
discrimination, and violence . . . . [T]he United States launched a six year, $1.6 billion initia-
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ever, it must be pointed out that to fulfill the commitments made at 
these summits a new level of cooperation is required. It is appropri-
ate, therefore, that the United Nations has declared the first ten 
years of the twenty-first century as dedicated to the creation of a 
Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World.110 
 
tive to fight domestic violence and even established a White House Council on Women to plan 
for the effective implementation in the United States of the platform for action” with full 
participation of NGOs. Id. It was the largest conference ever convened by the U.N., with 
5,000 delegates from 189 States and the European Union. In addition, an independent NGO 
Forum m attracted 30,000 participants. See id.; see also UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101. 
 109.  
The City Summit (Habitat II) in Istanbul in June 1996 produced a Declaration on 
Sustainable Human Settlements and brought together many of the themes of the 
previous world summits. Recognising that inadequate living conditions are a primary 
cause of social conflict, an agreement was reached on specific commitments such as 
adequate shelter for all, financing human settlements, international cooperation and 
review of progress in the future. 
Granoff, supra note 102, at 20. Reports were received from over 500 mayors and key munici-
pal leaders constituting the World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities. It also convened 
NGO groups in forums that included the World Business Forum, the Foundations Forum, the 
Academies of Sciences and Engineering Forum, the Professionals and Researchers Forum, the 
Parliamentarians Forum, the Labor Union’s Forum, the Forum on Human Solidarity, and 
even the Wisdom Keepers Forum. 
By the year 2010 over half the world’s population will be living in cities, with at 
least 20 mega cities. We are ill prepared to deal with the social repercussions of such 
a dramatic global transformation but the conference Secretary General, Wally N’dow 
put it simply, ‘The resources exist to put a roof over the head and bring safe water 
and sanitation for less than $100 per person to every man, woman and child on the 
planet.’ This is the new reality of security. 
Id.; see also UN BRIEFING PAPERS, supra note 101. 
 110.  
The International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children 
of the World can help set the course for the United Nations in the twenty-first cen-
tury towards a just and peaceful global community. In particular, the Programme of 
Action on a Culture of Peace for the Decade adopted by the General Assembly in 
resolution 53/243 B of 13 September 1999 calls for a global movement for a cul-
ture of peace and defines eight areas of action for the International Year for the Cul-
ture of Peace and for the International Decade. These eight areas ([UN General] 
Assembly resolution 53/243 B. paras. 9–16) span the full range of actions needed 
for the transition to a culture of peace and non-violence: 
(a) A culture of peace through education; 
(b) Sustainable economic and social development; 
(c) Respect for all human rights; 
(d) Equality between women and men; 
(e) Democratic participation; 
(f) Understanding, tolerance and solidarity; 
(g) Participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge; 
(h) International peace and security. 
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That Culture of Peace will require a pattern in which trust, re-
spect, and transparency will breed disarmament and reverse the pat-
tern of fear and threat that continues to justify irrational levels of ar-
maments. According to the Brookings Institution, the U.S. alone has 
spent $5.8 trillion on nuclear arms since 1940 and continues to 
spend over $90 million per day on nuclear weapons.111 General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower said, 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired 
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are 
not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms 
is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labor-
ers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.112 
The moral experience of shame has been placed in us along with 
the moral sensibility of revulsion. What right do we have to organize 
ourselves such that we might give human beings the Sophie’s choice 
to end all life on the planet in order to save a human creation, the 
state. As General Omar Bradley stated, 
We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world 
that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without con-
science. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the 
lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war 
than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about 
living.113 
It is time that we took bold moves to redress the moral incoher-
ence of the twentieth century. Now is the time in which “statesmen” 
and citizens114 must delve deep into themselves and, seeking a state 
 
International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, 
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/55/377 (2000); see also 
UNESCO website at <http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk>. 
 111. See MOXLEY, supra note 5, at 548 n.44 (citing Stephen I. Schwartz, Introduction to 
ATOMIC AUDIT 4 (Stephen I. Schwartz ed., 1998)). 
 112.  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chance for Peace, Speech Before the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors 3 (Apr. 16, 1953) (transcript available at <http://www.eisenhower.utexas. 
edu/chance.htm>). 
 113. GREEN, supra note 60, at 54 (quoting Lee Butler, Address to the Canadian Net-
work Against Nuclear Weapons (Mar. 11, 1999)). 
 114. Ambassador Richard Butler concludes his passionate book, The Greatest Threat: 
Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security, after setting forth 
suggestions to reduce risks posed by weapons of mass destruction, as follows: 
To conclude this book, I recall its opening epigraph, that is, the quote from Ed-
mond Burke: “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to 
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of grace, grasp this moment of hazard and opportunity with our full 
humanity.115 Ultimate hazard and horror is our future if we let it slip 
away; opportunity to lead the world in fulfilling nothing less than an 
ultimate moral imperative—nuclear disarmament—is ours if we meet 
the challenge. This is a long journey that must take us from fear and 
incoherence into reason, law, and moral coherence. Law alone will 
not lead us away from the brink of disaster, but without it the tools 
of statecraft and even wisdom are not adequate. 
 
do nothing.” Now consider these questions: What would Burke conclude about the 
challenge to all humanity posed by weapons of mass destruction? Would it meet the 
test of the triumph of evil if we did nothing? 
Absolutely. 
RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND 
THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY 242 (2000). There have been significant declarations re-
cently by military leaders and leaders of civil society, including present and former heads of 
state, and religious leaders that call for the elimination of nuclear weapons. See generally Global 
Security Institute, Present Undertakings (visited Nov. 21, 2000) <http://www.gsinstitute.org 
/projects/projects.html>. There are thousands of citizens organizations, Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), worldwide, working to reduce or eliminate the threats posed by nu-
clear weapons. Listed below are the web locations of several, some of which contain extensive 
links to many others: 
1) <http://www.igc.org/disarm/ngolinks.html>;  
2) Lawyers Alliance for World Security: <http://www.lawscns.org>;  
3) International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms: <http://www.ia-
lana.org>;  
4) Middle Power Initiative: <http://www.middlepowers.org>;  
5) International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*: <http://www. 
ippnw.org>;  
6) Global Security Institute: <http://www.gsinstitute.org>;  
7) Center for Defense Information: <http://www.cdi.org>;  
8) International Peace Bureau*: <http://www.ipb.org>;  
9) NGO Committee on Disarmament: <http://www.igc.org/disarm>; 
10) Acronym Institute: <http://www.acronym.org>;  
11) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: <http://www.napf.org>;  
12) The Henry L. Stimson Center: <http://www.stimson.org>;  
13) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <http://www.ceip.org>;  
14) Union of Concerned Scientists: <http://www.ucsusa.org>; and  
15) Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs*: <http://www.pug-
wash.org>. 
*Recipients of Nobel Peace Prizes 
 115. “There lies before us, if we choose, continued progress in happiness, knowledge, 
and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We ap-
peal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest.” THE 
EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 184. 
